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We analyze the limiting behavior of the risk premium associated with the Pareto op-
timal risk sharing contract in an infinitely expanding pool of risks under a general class
of law-invariant risk measures encompassing rank-dependent utility preferences. We show
that the corresponding convergence rate is typically only n1{2 instead of the conventional
n, with n the multiplicity of risks in the pool, depending upon the precise risk preferences.
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Sharing of risk, or risk exchange by redistributing risk among economic agents, is at the heart
of economics, insurance and finance. Its potential benefits and welfare implications have been
analyzed in a large literature that starts with Borch [5, 6] Arrow [2], Wilson [27] and DuMouchel
[11]; see also the early Arrow [1]. As the benefits of risk sharing often grow with the multiplicity
of risks, there are clear incentives for the formation of large pools of risk. In large risk pools,
by the Law of Large Numbers (whenever valid), the average risk is close to its expected value.
That is, by redistributing and subdividing risks in a sufficiently large pool, a nearly riskless
situation can be established.1
This paper explicitly derives the limiting behavior of the risk premium associated with
the Pareto optimally shared risk in an infinitely expanding pool of risks under a general class
of law-invariant risk measures encompassing rank-dependent utility preferences. While the
convergence of the shared risk to its expected value already follows from the Law of Large
Numbers, with corresponding convergence rate n, the limiting behavior of the risk premium is
much more delicate, and its convergence rate can be n or only n1{2 depending upon the agent’s
precise risk preferences. In the former case, a Law of Large Numbers suffices, in the latter case
a Central Limit Theorem is required to establish formal convergence proofs. This dichotomy
can be linked to the notion of first- and second-order risk aversion introduced by Segal and
Spivak [26].
This paper fits to the rapidly growing literature on the problem of risk sharing under general
preferences; see e.g., Carlier and Dana [7], Heath and Ku [17], Barrieu and El Karoui [3, 4],
Dana and Scarsini [9], Jouini, Schachermayer and Touzi [18], Filipović and Svindland [13],
Dana [10], Laeven and Stadje [21], Ravanelli and Svindland [24], and the references therein.
To our best knowledge, except in trivial cases, these papers do not establish the asymptotic
behavior of the associated risk premia.
2 Main Result
We fix a probability space pΩ,F , P q and denote by E r¨s the expectation operator with respect
to the reference probability measure P . For any random variable X defined on this probability
space, let
qXptq :“ inftm P R|P rX ď ms ě tu, t P r0, 1s, (2.1)
be its (left-continuous) quantile function, where inftHu “ 8 by convention.
We consider, on L8pΩ,F , P q “: L8pP q, a general class of preferences given by a numerical







where λ P p0, 1s. Note that U1p¨q “ E r¨s, and we set U0pXq :“ ess infX by convention. As is
well-known (e.g., Föllmer and Schied [14], Section 4.4), Uλp¨q admits the dual representation
Uλ pXq “ min
QPQλ
EQ rXs , (2.3)










, λ P p0, 1s, Q0 :“ tQ ! P u . (2.4)
Under law invariance, any superadditive comonotonic risk measure can be represented as a







Here, µ is a probability measure supported on r0, 1s. We refer to e.g., Ravanelli and Svindland
[24] for the link between law invariance and probabilistic sophistication.
Now let
VµpXq :“ u´1 pUµ pu pXqqq , (2.6)
with u : R Ñ R assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave2,
and Uµ as defined above.
In the following, we derive the precise limiting behavior, and the corresponding convergence




i“1 Xi, n P N. The Pareto optimality of the equal risk sharing contract (2.7) for
economic agents with risk preferences of the form (2.6) follows from Knispel et al. [19]. We
assume that the risks Xi are i.i.d. under the reference measure P .
More precisely, we analyze ?
nπpv, Sn{nq, (2.8)
as n Ñ 8, where the risk premium πpv, Sn{nq is given by
πpv, Sn{nq :“ v ` E rX1s ´ Vµpv ` Sn{nq, (2.9)
with v the agent’s initial wealth level. Indeed, to understand (2.9), one first solves for π̄pv, Sn{nq
in the equivalent utility equation
Uµ pu pv ` Sn{nqq “ u pv ´ π̄pv, Sn{nqq , (2.10)
yielding
π̄pv, Sn{nq “ v ´ Vµpv ` Sn{nq, (2.11)
and next considers the risk premium
πpv, Sn{nq “ E rSn{ns ` π̄pv, Sn{nq “ v ` E rX1s ´ Vµpv ` Sn{nq, (2.12)
which agrees with (2.9). As seen from (2.10)–(2.12), the risk premium is such that the economic
agent is indifferent between bearing the shared risk and paying the risk premium minus the
expectation of the shared risk. Henceforth, we take v ” 0 without losing generality. (Indeed,
one may re-define rXi :“ v ` Xi, i P N, and rSn{n :“ v ` Sn{n, respectively.) Thus, we analyze
?
n pE rX1s ´ VµpSn{nqq . (2.13)
2We note that concavity is not required for Theorem 2.1 below.
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Note that VµpSn{nq ď E rX1s for all n P N by Jensen’s inequality (and the dual represen-
tation and the monotonicity of u´1). In general, VµpSn{nq may not converge to E rX1s. We









µ pdλq ă 8; (2.14)
see Föllmer and Knispel [15]. In that case, Uµ is continuous with respect to L
1-convergence.
We state the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 Assume that u and u´1 are continuously differentiable and strictly increasing.






















where Z is a standard normal random variable under P and φ and Φ are its probability density
and cumulative distribution function (under P ), respectively.
Proof. We may assume that σX1 ą 0 since the assertion is trivial otherwise. We start by
computing a Taylor expansion of u pSn{nq around E rX1s up to the first order:











Next, by translation invariance of Uµ and invoking another first-order Taylor expansion (of
u´1),

































































Hence, by positive homogeneity of Uµ,
?















































In view of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Föllmer and Knispel [15], under condition (2.14),
Uµ pS˚nq Ñ Uµ pZq , (2.18)
with Z a standard normal random variable. By superadditivity,
Uµpu1pYnqS˚nq ´ Uµpu1pE rX1sqS˚nq ě Uµppu1pYnq ´ u1pE rX1sqqS˚nq Ñ 0,
since Yn Ñ E rX1s almost surely and in L1, and by continuity of u1 and L1-continuity of Uµ.
Similarly,
Uµpu1pE rX1sqS˚nq ´ Uµpu1pYnqS˚nq ě Uµppu1pE rX1sq ´ u1pYnqqS˚nq Ñ 0.



















This, with the product rule for limits of functions, proves the stated result. l
Remark 2.2 Note that up¨q does not appear on the right-hand side of (2.15), i.e., the limit is
independent of the function up¨q.
Of course, the convergence of the equal risk sharing contract to its expected value already
follows from the Law of Large Numbers, with corresponding rate of convergence n. The limiting
behavior of the risk premium is, however, much more delicate. Its convergence rate can be n,
as in Knispel et al. [19] under the expected utility model (which occurs when µ has full mass
on t1u, hence Uµp¨q “ E r¨s), or only n1{2, as typically in Theorem 2.1 of the present paper,
depending upon the agent’s precise risk preferences. In the former case a Law of Large Numbers
already suffices to establish the convergence proof, in the latter case a Central Limit Theorem
is required.
As Uµ corresponds to a concave distortion risk measure (Föllmer and Schied [14], Section
4.6) up to a sign change, (2.6) corresponds to a certainty equivalent in the popular rank-
dependent utility (RDU) model (Quiggin [23]). The RDU model encompasses Yaari’s [28] dual
theory of choice under risk and the expected utility model as special cases (when up¨q is affine
and µ has full mass on t1u, respectively).
Theorem 2.1 jointly with the results of Knispel et al. [19] reveal that the risk premium
under the RDU model features a “first-order” term in the limit unless one considers the plain
expected utility model without distortion in which case the limit features only a “second-order”
term.
This dichotomy can be linked to the notions of first- and second-order risk aversion intro-
duced by Segal and Spivak [26]; see also Lang [22] and Eeckhoudt and Laeven [12]. Indeed, the
insightful analysis of Segal and Spivak [26] shows that the risk premia have distinct limiting
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behavior for “small” risks under RDU and under expected utility: under the RDU model risk
aversion is a first-order phenomenon, while under the expected utility model risk aversion is





where M Ă M1pp0, 1sq with M1pp0, 1sq the class of probability measures on p0, 1s. From
Kusuoka [20] (see also Dana [8] and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin [16]) we know that, upon a
sign change, law-invariant coherent risk measures are of the form (2.20).
Furthermore, let
VMpXq :“ u´1 pUM pu pXqqq , (2.21)
with up¨q and UM as above. We now analyze
?
n pE rX1s ´ VMpSn{nqq , (2.22)











µ pdλq ă 8. (2.23)
We state the following theorem, our main result:
Theorem 2.3 Assume that u and u´1 are continuously differentiable and strictly increasing.






















where Z is a standard normal random variable under P and φ and Φ are its probability density
and cumulative distribution function (under P ), respectively.
Proof. Since UMpXq “ infµPM UµpXq is translation invariant and positively homogeneous, by
invoking two first-order Taylor expansions, we obtain
?










with Yn and S
˚
n defined as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 and with yn defined analogously (mutatis
mutandis).









u1 pE rX1sqUM pS˚nq “ u1 pE rX1sqUM pZq , (2.25)




UM pS˚nq “ UM pZq
(cf. the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Föllmer and Knispel [15]), hence, in view of superadditivity,
similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 yield (2.25). l
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[13] Filipović, D. and G. Svindland (2008). Optimal capital and risk allocations for law-
and cash-invariant convex functions. Finance & Stochastics 12, 423–439.
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